The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China in the middle of January. His visit was part of a series of top level visits regularly exchanged between India and China in the last few years, almost one every year. This contrasts with the situation during the long period from the late 1950s to 1988, when there was not a single visit exchanged between the two sides.

There is no doubt that the recent strengthening of ties between the two countries is driven by economics. This was reflected in the fact that some of the top figures from India's corporate world accompanied the PM on his visit. From just about $300 million in 1992, bilateral trade between India and China has increased to an astounding $30 billion plus, and is expected to touch $40 billion this year itself. During Manmohan Singh's visit, the two governments set a target for $60 billion by 2010, although the increase in trade between the two sides over the last few years has not been mainly due to state intervention. China is now India's largest trading partner in Asia. However, along with the galloping increase in trade, the trade deficit has also widened, with India unable to sell to China as much as it imports.

Regarding the border dispute, which has been the most persistent issue in India-China relations, there was no outward development, and both sides acknowledged that it will take some more time. However, the agreement to maintain “peace and tranquility” along the border, made more than a decade back, still holds. In the meantime, a new feature is the joint military exercises being held by both sides, with the first one having been held in China last month. In this visit, it was announced that the next will be held in India later this year, and that this would be a regular feature.

Politically, the key issue on which India wanted to approach China was the Indo-US nuclear deal. While China notably did not commit itself to supporting the deal when and if it comes before the Nuclear Suppliers Group, what it did promise was civilian nuclear cooperation with India on its own part. This was seen as an indirect acceptance of India's nuclear power status. Again, while China did not explicitly commit itself to supporting India's bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat, it said that it “recognised the aspirations” of India as a “major developing country” both in the UN and other international organisations.

Various agreements were signed covering a number of areas, including railways, housing, planning, health, etc. There was also an agreement to cooperate on issues concerning “land resource management” and resettlement and rehabilitation. This probably reflects the fact that governments in both countries have been facing criticism and opposition over the issue of takeover of land for mega projects. A document containing “A Shared Vision for the 21st century” was also signed, reiterating earlier stated positions about a relationship based on “friendship and trust”. It also said that this would have a positive influence on international relations.

Compared to the past, there is nowadays much more interest shown in the international media and political circles worldwide in the relations between India and China. The ruling circles in both India and China are striving to make their countries major players in the world arena, based on their recent economic growth and on their military, including nuclear, power.

While both are developing ever closer ties with the US, they also seek to maintain a degree of autonomy and room for manoeuvre, and don't want to put all their eggs in the American basket. US imperialism has made no secrets of the fact that it considers China as its biggest potential rival in its quest to retain its pre-eminent position in the world. It has pursued the path of striking a strategic partnership with India in order to use India to contain and encircle China. US imperialism would very much like the Indian ruling classes to play its game in Asia. In these circumstances, the developing relations between India and China must be welcomed.